

# **GPPS 479: POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA**

University of California, San Diego | Winter 2020 | Tue & Th 11:00am-12:20pm | RBC 3201

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February 20, 2020

## **1 Course description**

Latin America is an economically underdeveloped region with persistent poverty and high levels of income inequality. Billions of foreign aid dollars have been devoted to change this. Underlying all these efforts are a set of (implicit or explicit) ideas and beliefs about what are the causes of Latin America's underdevelopment. Some of these ideas focus on the proximate causes of underdevelopment. They argue that the reason why Latin America is underdeveloped is because the public policies that are in place are not conducive to sustained economic growth and reductions in poverty and inequality (e.g., "Latin America is underdeveloped because public schools are of poor quality and do not promote human capital accumulation"). Other ideas highlight the deeper historical and political roots of Latin America's underdevelopment. They propose explanations for why Latin American countries have adopted public policies that are not conducive to sustained economic growth. These deeper causes will be the focus of our course, with emphasis on two main questions: (1) How has the political history of Latin America shaped the region's long-term economic development trajectory? (2) What are the broad features of Latin American political systems in the contemporary period, and how does politics influence the choice of public policies?

## **2 Learning goals**

By the end of this course, students should be able to:

- Understand, talk and write about, what politics looks like in Latin America, and how politics shapes the region's economic development;
- Place current problems facing Latin American countries in long-term historical perspective;
- Identify unique political and economic problems that Latin America faces, and problems it faces that are common to other regions.

The course is an introduction to comparative politics and institutions in Latin America. It is not a course about current politics in Latin America, nor about politics in a specific subset of Latin American countries.

In addition, the course seeks to promote the development of two general skills:

- Critical thinking skills (which will be applied to assess the logic of existing theories and the quality of the evidence used to support these theories);
- Professional development skills including, for example, the ability to write clearly, make logical and well-substantiated arguments, use appropriate language in all communications, and participate thoughtfully and respectfully in group discussions, meet deadlines, and follow instructions.

### 3 Prerequisites

Policy Making Processes (PMP) and QMII are formal prerequisites.

### 4 Expectations and Grading

- **Class participation (20%)**. We will use iClickers to encourage class participation and discussion of the readings. All you need to do to get credit for participating in class is to answer all questions asked. Every class, you will get either 1 point for participation (if you answer all questions) or no points (no partial credit will be assigned). You get one “freebie” during the quarter to give you a buffer if you forget to answer a question or miss a class.

To get credit for class participation, your iClicker must be registered on Canvas by **January 13**. It is your responsibility to ensure that your iClicker is working well and is appropriately registered to receive course credit. For registration instructions, go to <https://blink.ucsd.edu/faculty/instruction/tech-guide/clickers/before-class/plan-course.html> and scroll down to “How to register your clicker in Canvas.” Support for iClickers is provided at the Service Desk located on the first floor of the Applied Physics and Mathematics building.

You can purchase new or used iClickers at the UCSD Bookstore (which also buys back used iClickers), or on Amazon (e.g., [here](#)), or you can borrow an iClicker from GPS that you must return at the end of the quarter. To borrow an iClicker from GPS, contact GPS IT.

- **Reading quizzes (20%)**: There will be 8 to 12 very short, unannounced, in-class quizzes throughout the quarter to provide credit for students who do the required readings.

- **Map quiz (10%)**. During our **January 23** class, students will be asked to locate some or all of the following countries on a map: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela [**10 points**].

All quizzes are administered at the very beginning of class so make sure you arrive on time.

- **Practical exercise (15% = 7.5% for individual component + 7.5% for the group component)**. The set-up for this exercise is the following:

They year is 2003. A Peronist, Néstor Kirchner, has just been elected President of Argentina with about 60% of the vote; his party also has a majority (but not a supermajority) in Congress. Soon after coming to power, the President obtains a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank to construct new kindergartens attached to already existing primary schools throughout the country. The loan must be used to construct exactly 20 new kindergartens. There are 229 municipalities distributed among 7 provinces, so not all municipalities can get a new kindergarten.

On **February 21**, I will post a dataset containing demographic, educational, electoral, and other information on each municipality.

Your job is to make an argument about what municipalities should get a new kindergarten taking into account the information you have about each municipality, your role in the government (see below), and the different theories we have learnt in the course. *What criteria should be used to decide which municipalities should get a new kindergarten?*

Tasks:

- First, for the *individual component* of this exercise, each student will be assigned a role in the government as either the National Minister of Education, the Minister of Infrastructure, the President's Chief of Staff, or the Peronist Party's leader in the Chamber of Deputies. Placing yourself in that role, write a 150-word paragraph explaining how you would allocate the new kindergartens/ what rules or criteria you would use to allocate kindergartens across municipalities. You should spend the bulk or all of your paragraph laying out and justifying the logic of allocation, not listing the specific municipalities or provinces. Your paragraph is due as a PDF by **9am on February 27 via Canvas**. Include only your Student ID on the PDF (do not include your name). Paragraphs that exceed 150 words will be penalized by a half-letter grade reduction (A to A-, A- to B+, etc.) every 10 extra words.
  - For the *group component*, **during class on February 27** you will be matched to other students who were assigned a different role. The group will debate the different possible rules/ criteria for deciding which municipalities should get a new kindergarten and present a single proposal to the President. Each person comes to the group with their own agenda and proposal (which may or may not coincide with the others'). The final group product is a one-pager explaining (a) what rules/ criteria the group considered; (b) what rule the group thinks the President should adopt, and (c) why you think the President should adopt this rule/ criteria and not the other ones they considered. Due by **12:20pm on February 27 via email** ([apaglayan@ucsd.edu](mailto:apaglayan@ucsd.edu)). Include only Student IDs on your PDF (do not include any names).
- Take-home Final Exam (35%, but scoring at least 60 points in the final exam is necessary for passing the course).** The take-home final exam will be on **March 18**. Although it is designed to be a 2.5-hours long exam, you can take it **anytime between 9am and 6pm** – and you can use that entire time if you want. The exam will include multiple choice and short-answer questions to assess your understanding of the materials covered in the course [**60 points**]; and one essay question where you will have the opportunity to integrate concepts covered throughout the quarter [**40 points**]. The essay question will be drawn from a list of possible questions that I will distribute in class on week 8 or 9. This will give you at least two weeks to prepare your essay response. Original insights will be rewarded the most, so you are encouraged to prepare independently.

**Rescheduling.** Quizzes, assignments, and exams will only be rescheduled for students who show proof of illness or experience a death or serious illness in the immediate family. Please don't kill any family members. Lying about the reasons why you cannot complete a quiz, assignment, or exam during the originally scheduled time constitutes a violation of the University's academic integrity standards (see **section 6**).

**Contesting a grade.** I hope there will be no reason to contest a grade. If you strongly feel that your grade on an assignment does not reflect the quality of your work, though, you may appeal through the

following procedure: Write a one-page, single-spaced memo that explains, in as much detail as possible, why you think you should have received a different grade. Send me your memo, your graded assignment, and a letter in which you formally request a re-grade. I will reevaluate the work and assign a new grade, which may be higher, lower, or identical to the one you originally received. This new grade will be final. Grade complaints will not be entertained beyond seven calendar days after the assignment has been returned to you.

## 5 Office hours and other resources

I encourage you to come to **office hours** to make the most out of the course. You can use office hours to go over things we covered in class, discuss how to approach an assignment, have a deeper discussion of a reading I assigned, etc. You can come to office hours in pairs or groups if you find that helpful.

I also encourage you to invest in your **writing skills** by taking advantage of the many resources that are available. I am happy to provide feedback on a draft during office hours. In addition, GPS's writing tutor, Brenden Paulsen, can usually provide feedback/ edits on a draft via email within 48 hours (email him your draft and the assignment prompt to [bvpaulse@ucsd.edu](mailto:bvpaulse@ucsd.edu)) or in person during his office hours: Mondays and Wednesdays from 9:00am-1:30pm and Tuesdays and Thursdays from 12:30pm-2:00pm in RBC 3130. Lastly, the UCSD [Writing Hub](#) also offers one-on-one consultations with experts who can provide feedback on your writing. Appointments are booked in advance, so plan ahead of time.

## 6 Academic honesty

All suspected cases of plagiarism, cheating, lying, or other violations of academic integrity standards will be referred to the Office of Academic Integrity. Any violation of UCSD's academic honesty policy for which a student is found responsible will be considered grounds for failing the course. You are expected to be the sole author of all your work, and to properly attribute ideas, quotations, and sources. If you are unsure how to do this, please come to office hours or ask in class. If you are unsure what constitutes plagiarism, cheating, or other violations, please see UCSD's [academic honesty policy](#).

Students agree that by taking this course all required written assignments will be submitted for textual similarity and plagiarism review via **Turnitin.com**. All submitted written assignments will be included as source documents in the Turnitin.com reference database solely for the purpose of detecting plagiarism of such papers. All written work must be submitted as a **.pdf file**. Work submitted as a Word, GoogleDoc, or other non-pdf document will be considered as not submitted.

## 7 Electronics policy

Laptops, tablets, phones, digital recorders, and other electronic devices are not allowed in class, except for students who provide an updated AFA letter (see **section 8**). The reason is that, according to most of the [research](#) available: (a) students tend to learn less and do worse in exams when they use laptops during lectures; and, crucially, (b) laptop use by one student harms the learning of students around them. Students who use electronics in class will lose their participation points for that class.

## **8 Requesting accommodations**

Students requesting accommodations for this course must provide a current Authorization for Accommodation (AFA) letter issued by the Office for Students with Disabilities (OSD) which is located in University Center 202 behind Center Hall. Students are required to present their AFA letters to faculty (please make arrangements to contact me privately) and to the OSD Liaison in GPS, Nancy Gilson ([ngilson@ucsd.edu](mailto:ngilson@ucsd.edu)), so that accommodations may be arranged in advance. Contact the OSD for further information: 858.534.4382 (phone); [osd@ucsd.edu](mailto:osd@ucsd.edu) (email); <http://disabilities.ucsd.edu> (website).

## **9 Email policy**

I will reply to emails within two business days.

## **10 Other**

By Wednesday, January 8 at 11:59pm, send me an email where you (a) describe your policy areas of interest and career goals in 2-3 sentences; (b) let me know if you have a question about the syllabus (or simply state “I don’t have any questions about the syllabus”); and (c) include a map of Latin America (any map you find on Google that labels each country is fine; copy-paste the map on the body of the email; no links or attachments please).

## **11 Schedule and readings**

This section provides an outline of the topic, motivating questions, and list of required and optional reading(s) for each class. All journal articles should be downloadable through the links provided below, which are accessible to UCSD users. If you have trouble with a link, you have the full citation information to find the article via Google Scholar. A few readings (book chapters) will be made available via Canvas.

Note that, per UCSD academic policies, students enrolled in a 4-unit course are expected to devote 9 hours per week to that course outside of class time. For GPPS 479, most of that time should be spent doing the reading assigned for each class.

### **WEEK 1**

#### **7-Jan Introduction**

*Course overview, learning goals, expectations, and motivating questions: How does Latin America compare to other regions in terms of economic development? Why is knowledge of politics important to understand Latin America’s development trajectory?*

#### **Required (1):**

Velasco, Andrés. November 28, 2019. “Bipolar Economics.” *Project Syndicate* ([link](#)).

## **PART I: Historical Political Origins of Latin America's Economic Underdevelopment**

### **9-Jan The role of geography and institutions**

*How did the natural resources, climate, and labor endowments that colonizers found influence the types of institutions they put in place and, with that, the region's long-term economic development?*

#### Required (3):

Course Syllabus.

Sokoloff, Kenneth, and Stanley Engerman. 2000. "Institutions, factor endowments, and paths of development in the new world." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14(3): 217-232 ([link](#)).

Bruhn, Miriam, and Francisco Gallego. 2012. "Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Do They Matter for Economic Development?" *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 94(2):433-461 ([link](#)).

#### Optional:

Dell, Melissa. 2010. "The persistent effects of Peru's mining *mita*." *Econometrica* 78(6):1863-1903 ([link](#)).

Abad, Leticia Arroyo. 2013. "Persistent inequality? Trade, factor endowments, and inequality in republican Latin America." *The Journal of Economic History* 73(1):38-78 ([link](#)).

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *The American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369-1401 ([link](#)).

### **WEEK 2**

#### **14-Jan The role of Catholicism**

*How has the presence of the Catholic Church since colonial times impacted Latin America's economic development?*

#### Required (2):

Woodberry, Robert. 2012. "The missionary roots of liberal democracy." *American Political Science Review* 106(2): 244-274 ([link](#)).

Valencia Caicedo, Felipe. 2018. "The Mission: Human capital transmission, economic persistence, and culture in South America." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 134(1):507-556. ([link](#)). **Skim-read only the empirical analysis sections (e.g., data, methods, findings).**

#### Optional:

Waldinger, Maria. 2017. "The Long-Run Effects of Missionary Orders in Mexico." *Journal of Economic Development* 127: 355-378 ([link](#)).

Becker & Woessmann. 2009. "Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124(2): 531-596.

## **16-Jan The role of conflict for the formation of state capacity**

*What do we mean by state capacity? How did interstate wars during the 19<sup>th</sup> and early-20<sup>th</sup> century contribute to shape Latin American states' fiscal capacity?*

### Required (2):

Centeno, Miguel. 1997. "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America." *American Journal of Sociology* 102(6): 1565-1605 ([link](#)). **Read only pp. 1565-1589 (up to "Timing is Everything")**

Queralt, Didac. 2018. "The Legacy of War on Fiscal Capacity." Working Paper ([link](#)).

### Optional:

Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Capital, Coercion, and European States*. Blackwell.

## **WEEK 3**

## **21-Jan The role of conflict for the formation of state capacity (cont.)**

*How did domestic conflict between political elites during the 19<sup>th</sup> and early-20<sup>th</sup> century contribute to shape Latin American states' fiscal capacity, states' symbolic capacity, and the formation of human capital?*

### Required (2):

Garfias, Francisco. 2018. "Elite competition and state capacity development: Theory and evidence from post-revolutionary Mexico." *American Political Science Review* 112(2): 339-357 ([link](#)).

Paglayan, Agustina. 2017. "Civil War, State Consolidation, and the Spread of Mass Education." Working Paper ([link](#)).

## **23-Jan From autocracy to democracy, and how the type of political regime influences economic growth**

*When did Latin American countries transition to democracy? Why might the type of political regime (autocracy vs. democracy) have an impact on economic growth? What does the existing evidence say about the effect of democracy on economic growth?*

### Required (2):

Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, democracy, and development." *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 567-576 ([link](#)).

Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. 2019. "Democracy does cause growth." *Journal of Political Economy* 127(1): 47-100 ([link](#)). **Skim-read only the empirical analysis sections (e.g., data, methods, findings).**

### Optional:

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. "Economic backwardness in political perspective." *American Political Science Review* 100(1): 115-131 ([link](#)). **Review main argument if you don't remember it from PMP.**

Boix, Miller and Rosato. 2012. "A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-2007." *Comparative Political Studies* 46(12): 1523-1554.

Przeworski, Adam. 2005. "Democracy as an equilibrium." *Public Choice* 123: 253-273.

**In-class map quiz** (begins at 11am)

## WEEK 4

### 28-Jan Theories of how autocracies work

*Types of autocratic regime: Military dictatorships vs. personalist regimes vs. hegemonic party regimes. Their goals, incentives, mechanisms used to build legitimacy, and ability to survive.*

#### Required (2):

Geddes, Barbara. 2003. *Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research design in comparative politics*. University of Michigan Press (Canvas). **Read only pages 44-88.**

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Introduction (Canvas).

#### Optional:

Hsieh, Chang-Tai, Edward Miguel, Daniel Ortega, and Francisco Rodriguez. 2011. "The price of political opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's *Maisanta*." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 3(2): 196-214.

### 30-Jan Theories of how democracies work

*Median voter theorem, selectorate theory, the Meltzer-Richard model, and economic voting theories. Assumptions, predictions, and criticisms. Capture theories of democracy.*

#### Required (2):

Campello, Daniela, and Cesar Zucco. 2016. "Presidential Success and the World Economy." *The Journal of Politics* 78(2): 589-602 ([link](#)).

Albertus, Michael, and Mark Deming. November 5, 2019. "Pinochet Still Looms Large in Chilean Politics." *Foreign Policy* ([link](#)).

## PART II: Politics and Policymaking in Latin America

## WEEK 5

### 4-Feb Presidentialism, Hyperpresidentialism, and Legislatures

*Among democratic regimes, what are the features that distinguish presidential from parliamentary systems? Why might the presence of a presidential system (versus a parliamentary one) affect (a) the stability of democracy, and (b) the effectiveness of governments? What does the evidence say about the relationship between the type of political system on one hand, and democratic stability and policymaking on the other?*



Required (4):

Mainwaring, Scott. 2000. "Presidentialism in Latin America." In Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 13. (Canvas)

Linz, Juan. 2000. "The Perils of Presidentialism." In Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 14. (Canvas)

Saiegh, Sebastian. "Policy differences among parliamentary and presidential systems." In Roger Congleton, Bernie Grofman and Stefan Voigt (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press ([link](#)). **Skim-read only the empirical analysis sections (e.g., data, methods, findings).**

Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Adam Przeworski, and Sebastian Saiegh. 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." *British Journal of Political Science* 34: 565-587 ([link](#)). **Skim-read only the empirical analysis sections (e.g., data, methods, findings).**

**6-Feb Presidentialism, Hyperpresidentialism, and Legislatures (cont.)**

*How is power distributed between the Executive and the Legislature, and what does this imply for the policymaking process? The pivotal politics model and its predictions.*

Required (1):

Stein, Ernesto, Mariano Tommasi, Koldo Echebarria, Eduardo Lora, and Mark Payne. 2006. *The Politics of Policies. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America*. **Chapter 3: start with the title "Legislatures" and read through the end of the chapter (pages 41-60 based on the page numbers that appear on the hard copy).** Inter-American Development Bank and David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University (available on Canvas).

Optional:

Carnes, Nicholas, and Noam Lupu. 2014. "Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1):1-18 ([link](#)).

Carnes, Nicholas, and Noam Lupu. 2016. "What Good Is a College Degree? Education and Leader Quality Reconsidered." *Journal of Politics* 78(1):35-49 ([link](#)).

**WEEK 6**

**11-Feb Populism**

*What are the core features of populist parties? When did they emerge and why? Who forms part of their coalition of support?*

Required (1):

Di Tella, Torcuato. 1984. "The Popular Parties: Brazil and Argentina in a Latin American Perspective." *Government and Opposition* 19(2): 250-268 ([link](#)).

Optional:

De la Torre, Carlos. 2007. "The Resurgence of Radical Populism in Latin America." *Constellations* 14(3) ([link](#)).

Lupu, Noam, and Susan Stokes. 2009. "The Social Bases of Political Parties in Argentina, 1912–2003." *Latin American Research Review* 44(1):58-87 ([link](#)).

**13-Feb Clientelism**

*What is clientelism? How does it affect political accountability in a democracy? Who is more likely to be a recipient of clientelistic goods, and why? How is the electoral behavior of clientelistic voters monitored? Who distributes clientelistic goods and monitors voters' electoral behavior on behalf of a political party? Why do brokers act as brokers?*

Required (1):

Stokes, Susan. 2005. "Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 315-325 ([link](#)).

Optional:

Nichter, Simeon, and Michael Peress. 2017. "Request Fulfilling: When Citizens Demand Clientelist Benefits." *Comparative Political Studies* 50: 1086–1117. ([link](#))

Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2012. "What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 568–583. ([link](#))

**WEEK 7**

**18-Feb Patronage and the state bureaucracy**

*What is patronage? When and why do political parties distribute public-sector jobs using non-meritocratic criteria for allocating these jobs? Why would a political party tie its own hands by introducing a civil service reform that prevents it from being able to distribute patronage jobs?*

Required (2):

Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2004. "Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine electoral market." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 742-757 ([link](#)).

Akthari, Mitra, Diana Moreira, and Laura Trucco. 2018. "Political turnover, bureaucratic turnover, and the quality of public services." Working Paper ([link](#)).

## 20-Feb Programmatic policies and elections

*Does clientelism actually help politicians win votes? Why would politicians shift from clientelism to programmatic policies?*

### Required (2):

Imai, Kosuke, Gary King, and Carlos Velasco Rivera. 2016. “Do nonpartisan programmatic policies have partisan electoral effects? Evidence from two large scale randomized experiments.” *American Journal of Political Science* 351(B2): 303-341 ([link](#)).

Geddes, Barbara. 1991. “A game theoretic model of reform in Latin American democracies.” *American Political Science Review* 85(2): 371-392 ([link](#)).

### Optional:

Zucco, Cesar. 2013. “When Payouts Pay Off: Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior in Brazil 2002–10.” *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4): 810-822 ([link](#)).

## WEEK 8

25-Feb No class

27-Feb Clientelism, patronage, and public goods provision: A practical exercise

**Individual component due at 9am on Feb-27**

-- In-class exercise. Bring your computer. No required reading --

**Group component due at 12:20pm on Feb-27**

## WEEK 9

3-Mar Social protest

*What explains the rise of mass protests and demonstrations?*

### Required (2):

Kuran, Timur. 1991. “Now out of never: The element of surprise in the East European revolution of 1989.” *World Politics* 44(1): 7-48. ([link](#))

González, Felipe. “Collective action in networks: Evidence from the Chilean student movement.” Working Paper ([link](#)).

### Optional:

Paul Segal hypothesis for why in 2019 we saw social protest in Chile but not Argentina: <https://twitter.com/pdsegal/status/1186203180213907456>

## **5-Mar Institutions, public-sector corruption, and elections**

*What is the level of corruption in Latin America compared to other regions? How do political institutions affect politicians' incentives to engage in corruption? Does knowing that a candidate was corrupt influence that candidate's chance of winning an election?*

### Required (2):

Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. 2011. "Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from the audits of local governments." *American Economic Review* 101(4): 1274-1311 ([link](#)).

Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. 2008. "Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(2): 703-745 ([link](#)).

### Optional:

Fujiwara, Thomas. October 24, 2017. "Political inclusion and development outcomes: Brazil introduces electronic voting." *VoxDev* ([link](#)).

## **WEEK 10**

### **10-Mar Business and labor groups' influence**

#### Required (2):

Boas, Taylor, Dani Hidalgo, and Neal Richardson. 2014. "Campaign Donations and Government Contracts in Brazil." *Journal of Politics* 76(2): 415-429 ([link](#)).

Larreguy, Horacio, Cesar Montiel, and Pablo Querubin. 2017. "Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(4): 877-891 ([link](#)).

### **12-Mar Wrap-up: The challenges facing Latin America**

-- No required reading. --